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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Time to Look at Realities

by Henry Ford II

We are faced with a series of problems, some new, some old familiar ones in a new guise, which we cannot ignore or brush aside any longer. The stakes are too high. We are going to have to ask the hard questions, and find the hard answers, not next year or the year after but starting right now. Vacillation before the urgent pressure of these events can only lead from one disaster to another.

We can no longer afford to take a passive stand and merely react to things after they happen in a sort of fire-alarm diplomacy. We've got to get out ahead of events and try to lead and shape them to the best of our ability. There is no dodging the fact that the United States is the natural leader of the free world. In that role it will star gloriously or flop miserably before the judgment of history.

Let's look at some of those hard questions that we as a people must ask ourselves and our government—keeping a completely open mind.

In the Middle East there is a whole bill of particulars that needs filling out. We have talked about recourse to "moral force" and support of the UN as our basic approach to the problems of this area. We have put our-

selves on record as ready to defend with arms anybody attacked by a Communist nation, and have made various other moves to discourage the Soviets as the House Foreign Affairs Committee has suggested. There has not been much, as yet, however, to indicate just what we want to do to settle the Arab refugee problem, to bring about a just and lasting settlement of Arab-Israeli disputes and to assure the free international use of the Suez Canal. The American public is just as much in the dark about what we propose to do in these situations as anybody else in the world. All we know for sure is that no one but we can ultimately bring about a solution of these problems—except possibly the Russians. Neither the UN nor any free nation can act effectively here until it knows where the United States stands.

In another realm, I think we've got to take a new look at our relations with the Communist satellites. Thus far, we have tended to apply economic sanctions in the form of drastic trade limitations and laws which largely prohibit us from offering them economic help. Even to suggest that we should help out some of these people or do business with them has

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been to risk the charge of being soft on communism. But it appears that our policies have tended to play right into the Kremlin's hands to the extent that they make the satellites more dependent on Moscow. I think we need to be realistic and decide whether our trade-and-aid policies toward such satellite areas as Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and even Red China are really in our own best interests. Maybe the people of Red China are just as anxious to get rid of the yoke of communism as the Hungarians have demonstrated they were. Shouldn't we give them the chance—or at least some alternative to their present ties with the Kremlin?

What is to be our policy toward the Western alliance? The Suez crisis has caused such a severe economic strain in Britain that she may be forced to cut back on the highest relative military burden borne by any NATO nation and withdraw her forces from Western Germany. You will remember that she was forced to withdraw from Greece for economic reasons in 1947, and we moved in to replace her. Are we prepared in 1957 to pick up her share of the tab in West Germany? What can we do—what should we do—to help compensate for the prestige loss and the economic loss of Western Europe in the Middle East? How far should we be willing to go in seeking a settlement of the critical question of uniting East and West Germany? Some day—and not too far away—Germany will be united again. But under whose sponsorship will that take

place—ours or the Russians? So far it looks as if the Russians are trying to use our kind of program all along the line.

Soviet Economic Challenge

Finally, I would ask, How do we propose to go about meeting the new Soviet economic and political aggression on a world-wide front? We obviously cannot compete solely with armaments and military aid. Basically, we must accept the challenge by devising realistic and long-term programs of trade and aid.

This is a struggle for which we are uniquely fitted by both tradition and experience. If American know-how and ingenuity have anything to contribute to the progress of mankind, it is precisely in the areas of this conflict. If we don't step up and meet this test, then the Russians will have licked us at the game we know best.

Both government and private enterprise have important roles to play in that struggle. I would not presume to comment on the public role, except in very general terms.

I believe we must, for example, have consistent and long-range policies in foreign aid if they are to be effective. I think we should be willing to be venturesome and imaginative in our economic aid thinking; where a big investment promises to pay off big in terms of reaching our goals of peace and prosperity, we ought to be willing to take chances. I think we ought to develop a more realistic and unemotional approach to foreign aid. We should look upon

our wealth and military power as sharp tools that may be used coldly and logically to pursue national ends—ends that we believe are right and humane.

We should get rid of the childish notion that we are out to buy love or friendship. Our foreign-aid money should be spent in such a way as to represent the best we have to offer in ideas, in people and in portraying the strength of our society to peoples abroad. But we should recognize that no one is going to love us for what we give them. We are much too big, too rich and powerful for anyone to love us. What we should expect is for other nations to realize our friendship is to be desired and our antipathy to be avoided in their own best interests.

Businessman's Viewpoint

As a businessman, I am naturally concerned with this situation from a business viewpoint. I feel, for example, that an enlightened trade and aid outlook is sound not merely because of the Soviet threat but because it is in our own best long-run business interests to strengthen the economies and raise the living standards of the people we want to do business with all over the world.

Because we have a stake in that, we businessmen also have an obligation to help our government promote its economic objectives. Private capital, for example, is an increasingly important tool for developing the less advanced countries, and there is a lot that can be done by cooperation

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What Military Strategy in Nuclear Age?

One can be dogmatic—in general—in talking about what America's military strategy in the nuclear age should be. Obviously, it should be nuclear. It should include possession of better weapons than any possessed by a potential enemy. It could substitute quality for quantity up to a point—but not beyond. It should include ability to put out brush-fire wars—as well as to win an atomic war. It must provide means for instant massive retaliation—but also assurance that the world will not be torn apart just to destroy some minor political termite.

The real trouble in defining nuclear age military strategy comes when one gets down to specifics. For the specifics involve charting the unknown and even the unknowable. Yet because our national existence depends on doing just that, Washington is at present the clearing-house for a flood of good, bad and indifferent military proposals.

There is, for example, the plate-glass theory, which holds that in the atomic age you need only a handful of soldiers at the Iron Curtain's edge. Let the enemy attack; the plate glass is broken, and the Strategic Air Force takes off instantly on a massive retaliatory obliteration raid.

Then there is the guided-missile concept, which says, "Let Honest John, and Redstone and ICBM's do the job." You can trim manpower as you build up missile power. Prepare for push-button war, with missiles, rockets, H-bombs, doing the fighting and winning the war.

What all this discussion points up is that the United States, just like every other country, is trying to develop a revolutionary new strategy

that fits the revolution in weaponeering which has occurred since World War II. But what, then, should be our military strategy? What of the armed services—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force? What should be their roles, their weapons, their deployment, their assignments?

Take the Navy. Is a surface Navy with its impressive battleships and its aircraft carriers safe from atomic attack? Wouldn't it be much better to "sink" the Navy—that is, put it under water where enemy A-bombs and missiles can't find it? Wouldn't a nuclear submarine Navy be the answer to the danger of our Navy's becoming a "sitting duck" in this nuclear age? Atomic submarines can circle the globe, can launch missiles, can carry supplies, can transport troops. The Navy's future is one of the most controversial issues involved in this whole question of modern strategy and military tactics.

Air Force in Lead

One thing has been generally and widely accepted: Nuclear age strategy means emphasis on air power. There is no end of talk here and everywhere of pilotless planes, rockets, guided missiles, atomic warheads, ICBM, massive retaliation. The Army and the Navy are fighting a rear-guard action to save themselves from an Air Force blitz. But the day belongs to the Air Force, as military appropriations make clear—although it is as yet not clear just what the AAF is going to do with the priority it has attained.

In this nuclear age the Army obviously must go nuclear. There is not a military hearing on Capitol Hill, hardly a Presidential press con-

ference, where it is not pointed out that today atomic weapons are conventional weapons. The United States is not only supplying them to its troops in this country, but it is supplying them to troops overseas. And our friends and allies are pressing Washington for rockets, missiles, atomic weapons. Britain's new defense minister, Duncan Sandys, was in Washington at the end of January on just such a mission. The NATO Council is deliberately shifting strategy to a nuclear missile foundation.

In the nuclear age it would be suicidal to crowd vast armies into minuscule areas. So the United States is working with, and developing, atomic support commands. These are small elite units which could be flown in quickly to back up ground troops abroad. One such support command is already operating in Italy; another is planned for Turkey. President Eisenhower, in his budget message to Congress on January 16, spoke of creating six new atomic support commands.

There is also much debate these days as to whether a small, truly professional army might not be better for meeting nuclear dangers—considering the training required to teach men how to operate complicated modern weapons. And, finally, there are interminable arguments about whether American armies should be stationed abroad, in view of weapons developments, or might be more valuable at home and "on the ready" to take off in any direction whenever and wherever war threatens.

NEAL STANFORD

(The seventh in a series of eight articles on "Decisions . . . 1957," a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)



Middle East Tightrope

The controversy over United Nations sanctions against Israel has highlighted the complexities of the persisting Middle East crisis, which the United States has tackled simultaneously through the UN and through unilateral diplomatic negotiations with some of the Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia and Iraq. While the Senate continues to debate various facets of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Administration finds itself walking a tightrope in one of the most delicate balancing acts in modern diplomacy.

Sanctions Dilemma

The prospect that the Afro-Asian bloc might succeed in pushing sanctions against Israel through the UN created a three-pronged dilemma for the United States.

First, it became clear that while Iraq and Saudi Arabia are willing to make military and economic arrangements with this country, King Saud still regards Nasser as a leading spokesman of Arab nationalism, and that both Saudi Arabia and Iraq have not abandoned their hostility toward Israel. It is still a question whether the Arab states will accept anything short of the elimination of Israel as a basis for peace.

Second, Israel made it clear that it will not abandon the advantages it has gained by military action in the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba for mere promises of future support for its claims by the UN or the United States. The Israelis feel that in the past both UN resolutions and American pledges of security proved of no value when Egypt insisted on closing the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships and trade

with Israel, thereby threatening their country with economic strangulation; nor did they prevent Egyptian *fedayeen* raids on Israeli territory. Henceforth the Israelis want concrete assurances, not paper promises. Yet concrete assurances, particularly when not previously discussed with Egypt—as appears to have been the case with Washington's initial pro-

leader in the Senate. Denouncing the attempt of the Afro-Asian bloc to impose sanctions on Israel, Senator Knowland declared in the Senate on February 7 that a double standard of international morality was "growing like a cancer at the heart of the United Nations." In an address on February 11 at Georgetown University he asserted that "our foreign policy is an American policy and is not and will not be tied as a tail to a United Nations kite." He also urged curtailment of the great-power veto in the UN Security Council to prevent the U.S.S.R. from voting on issues where it was accused of violating the sovereignty of others.

The suggestion made by UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold on February 11, that a decision on sanctions be postponed, eased the immediate pressure on both the UN and the Eisenhower Administration. In the midst of the debate, however, few noted that the United States has been applying sanctions of its own against Israel since the fateful Sinai invasion. Israel had been counting in 1957 on \$30 million in American grants-in-aid and on a \$75 million loan from the Export-Import Bank, in addition to over \$100 million from American Jewish groups and State of Israel bonds. The grants-in-aid and the loan have been stopped. The impact of this loss of \$105 million can be most clearly understood when it is realized that in 1955 Israel had a foreign trade deficit of about \$230 million—a deficit made up by American contributions, private and governmental, and by German reparations, estimated at about \$70 million annually.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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posal about the right of "innocent passage" through the Gulf of Aqaba—threaten to diminish our newly won prestige among Arabs. At the same time, the United States is now directly interested in the Aqaba passage because it might offer an alternative to Suez for maritime transport of oil.

And, third, talk of sanctions brought the most vigorous attack of recent years on the United Nations from Senator William F. Knowland, Republican of California, his party's



Kashmir's Far-Reaching Impact

by A. M. Rosenthal

Mr. Rosenthal, correspondent of *The New York Times* in India since 1954, first joined the staff of that newspaper in 1944. From 1946 to 1952 he was a member of its United Nations bureau.

NEW DELHI—The Kashmir case has been dogging the United Nations for so long, the debates have been so wearisome, the arguments so repetitious, that it is easy to assume that nothing has really changed, that it is all unimportant, and that the same old record simply keeps spinning on the political turntable.

This is quite easy—and quite wrong. The fact is that in the past nine years the case of Kashmir has built up a set of attitudes and habits of thinking in India and Pakistan which have an importance far transcending the boundaries of the two countries. For these attitudes and ways of thinking color the way Indians and Pakistanis see the rest of the world.

In the West there is a natural tendency to think about Pakistani or Indian foreign policy strictly in terms of the West's own problems. The United States feels a natural warmth toward Pakistan because since September 8, 1954, that country has become part of our military structure. By contrast, there is a coldness toward India because, at best, India stands aloof and often shows a determined understanding of the problems and fears of Russia and Communist China which it cannot seem to muster for the West.

But to a degree that is difficult to exaggerate, the foreign policy of Pakistan and India is based, not on great problems of global strategy, but on each other and most especially on Kashmir.

This reporter, for instance, has yet to meet a Pakistani who in frank

conversation would argue seriously that his country entered the Western military alliance because of fear of attack by Russia or China. Pakistan wants arms, not against the Communist nations, but against India. This does not mean that the Pakistanis are arming for a swift, knockout attack against India. It does mean that the Pakistanis think they can only be in a position to deal with India diplomatically and politically if they are militarily strong.

Kashmir Colors Policies

As for the Indians, it is Pakistan, more than the United States or the Soviet Union, which determines how they will act or react. The Indians say they are against military pacts, but they have little to say about any pacts except those which involve Pakistan. The United States has told New Delhi that arms given to Pakistan will never be used against India. But it is more than a little naïve of Americans to expect Indians to base the security of their country on this promise.

And it is Pakistan and Kashmir which determine to an important extent how Indians react to the Soviet Union. An Indian editor once told this reporter that he simply could not understand why Americans were puzzled about India's warmth or at least caution toward Moscow. To him things were fairly simple. The possibility existed that India and Pakistan would one day get into a war over Kashmir. When that day came, India would want to have friends, good friends, in the United

Nations Security Council. It would want friends who would give it material help.

The influence of Kashmir goes beyond the attitudes of India and Pakistan toward the major powers. It also determines how both countries react to the smaller nations.

For several years now, India has been carrying on an intensive and quite successful campaign to make friends with the Muslim nations. The gains have been obvious. King Saud of Saudi Arabia and President Shukri al-Kuwatly of Syria both have given "good chits" to India—statements that India treats its Muslim population of over 40 million well. This has caused pain and anger in Pakistan. But more important is the fact that the Indians have dashed Pakistani hopes of uniting the Muslim world against India's occupation of Kashmir. Pakistani newspapermen and officials try hard to get visiting Muslim statesmen to commit themselves on this—and usually fail.

Indians, of course, pay a political price for this, but it is not terribly heavy. It has mostly to do with consistency and morality, and New Delhi seems to be willing to pay this price. Just about every time nations have found themselves in a dispute which brought them to the brink of war or over it, India has used all its influence to get a peace settlement or at least get direct negotiations going. This has been the case in Indochina and in Korea. It has been the case in the dispute between Washington and Peiping, between Moscow and Washington. "Negotiate, negotiate," the

Indians have always said. But not when it comes to the Arab-Israeli controversy. Nehru obviously has some weight and influence in the Arab world—but he has refused to use them in favor of Arab-Israeli talks. The reason, quite obviously, is that he would run the danger of antagonizing the Muslim nations he has been cultivating so carefully for so long.

The Pakistanis, too, see the Muslim nations they once counted as brothers through the spectacles of Kashmir. Prime Minister Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy, probably the most adroit politician his country has produced, is practically the only Asian leader who is unafraid to speak his mind about President Nasser.

There are other Asian politicians who have no love for the dictator of the Nile. But they keep their less pleasant thoughts about Nasser to themselves because the Egyptian leader has become a symbol of nationalist leadership and martyrdom. Suhrawardy, however, has worked carefully to make Pakistanis realize that Nasser has chosen India over Pakistan in the Kashmir case.

Thus India and Pakistan seem to have arrived at one fundamental agreement about Kashmir. Both countries use it as a yardstick for judging other nations and for shaping their own policies. It is not the only Indian or Pakistani yardstick, but it is the most important one.

Kashmir and Internal Affairs

The story of Kashmir has also had important psychological and political effects within India and Pakistan.

In Pakistan, the case of Kashmir has been simultaneously a source of national frustration and of political escapism. So long as the Muslim majority of Kashmir is denied a chance to express its opinion by plebiscite, no Pakistani government can feel it is

a successful government. This sense of almost unbearable frustration becomes even stronger the farther one travels in West Pakistan from Karachi. In Azad Kashmir, the area held by Pakistan, government officials say there is only one way to get what they feel religiously and emotionally is theirs by right, and that is the way of war. There is bitterness against India, naturally; but there is also bitterness against Karachi for standing in the way of war, and bitterness against the United States and Britain for not coming fully to the aid of an ally.

This frustration has been a burden for Pakistan. But some Pakistani politicians have found it convenient to be able to blame India, the West, the East—just about everybody but themselves—for their country's economic, political and diplomatic troubles. This, however, does not apply to Suhrawardy, who is doing what all Pakistani prime ministers must do—fight for Kashmir—and doing it more skillfully than his predecessors.

In India the Kashmir case has contributed to the already rather fully developed national myopia.

It came as something of a shock to Indians to find that the Security Council would vote 10 to 0 in favor of a resolution which in effect declared the accession of Kashmir to India illegal without a plebiscite. This should not have been a shock. For years it has been clear that most of the world considered India wrong in its refusal to allow a plebiscite, no matter how urgent and real its reasons may be. And since even some Indians are beginning to realize that V. K. Krishna Menon, the latest man to take over the job of presenting India's case, is a spectacular failure at winning friends for his country, there was no reason to expect a change.

With the shock came rationalizations, another side-effect of the Kashmir case. "The world would not listen to India's case." "The Council's judgment was based on power politics, not legalities or moralities." "Our friends deserted us." "People are against us." "Earlier Indian delegates did a terrible job." All sorts of reasons have been advanced, except the obvious one that whether India is right or wrong in Kashmir, it has not been able to convince the world that it is right.

This refusal to see can be carried to almost incredible lengths. India makes it clear it will not abide by a United Nations decision, yet a few days later Mr. Krishna Menon berates Israel for not carrying out a United Nations' decision. And nobody in India seems to think: Is this not a little strange?

India's Kashmir Achievements

There is another place where the Kashmir case has produced reactions and results which do not show up in United Nations debates or resolutions—and that is Kashmir.

Economically, the Indians are doing a good job in their part of Kashmir, in some ways a better job than is being done in some parts of India. Schools are built, villagers are taught improved methods of agriculture, rice is made cheap, irrigation canals are dug, a powerhouse and a year-round tunnel are constructed. Land reform is carried through ruthlessly. The big landowners may object, but the peasants do not. Farmers get credits, and craftsmen and shopkeepers get tourists.

Politically, India and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Muslim prime minister of the Indian-held part of Kashmir, have established an authoritarian state. The normal place of residence for opposition leaders is jail. Indian leaders are embarrassed

by this, know it is a blot on India's political record, and talk of relaxing their control, but so far it is just talk.

Pakistanis say that economic benefits will not win over Kashmir's Muslims, that India is a colonial power, and that history has shown that colonialists cannot "buy" the people under them. This is a bit too pat. India may not be the country Kashmiris would choose, given a free choice, but neither is it a foreign colonial power. While the Kashmiri would probably vote for Pakistan, he is also a bit dubious about Pakistan's own political and economic record.

The economic and social benefits India is giving to the Kashmiri may not make him change his mind completely, may not change the fact that, given a chance, he would vote for Pakistan. But what the Indians are counting on, and what seems to be taking place, is that these benefits and the resulting stability are taking the bitter edge off resistance to India. The Kashmiri may not be wild about Indian rule, but he has shown little sign of being ready to go into the street to oppose it.

The Indians believe that time is on their side. The more frank among them admit that a plebiscite would favor Pakistan. But they think that year by year the Pakistani majority is being whittled down and that one day—ten years, say, or twenty years from now—it may all be academic.

Errors on Both Sides

The Pakistanis hope and believe that in their optimism the Indians are making a big mistake. And certainly the record of the Kashmir case has been one of mistakes committed by both sides, mistakes from the purely pragmatic, or winner-take-all, point of view.

The greatest mistake was a military one made by Pakistan. In 1947, when the Kashmir conflict started,

the Muslim tribesmen, after crossing Pakistani territory and fighting in Kashmir under Pakistani officers, had just about achieved victory. They were at a place called Baramula, about 30 miles from the valley's only airport at Srinagar. The tribesmen stopped for a bit of looting and raping at Baramula, and, by the time they had had enough the Indians had taken over the airport and begun that remarkable airlift from New Delhi which was to give India the Vale of Kashmir.

India's errors were political, although not quite as expensive as those of Pakistan because it was in occupation. From the Indian point of view the first error was that of Nehru when he agreed to the suggestion of India's last viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, that the accession of Kashmir to India by the Hindu maharaja be made conditional on the will of the Muslim people. New Delhi's enthusiasm for testing the will of the people faded away quickly, but it was about eight years before it got around to saying so.

Another major blunder was India's handling of the Kashmir case at the United Nations. The blunder consisted in agreeing to discuss a whole series of resolutions which put India and Pakistan on an equal footing, after India had come to the Security Council in 1948 with the charge that Pakistan was the aggressor.

True enough, India could not convince the council that Pakistan was the aggressor. But for the sake of the record and of the future the logical thing would have been to refuse to get involved in a whole structure of resolutions, commissions, reports and mediators unless the council agreed to fix responsibility. That is the demand which was made by the West in the case of Korea, and by the Arabs in the case of Egypt.

Those mistakes by India led to the

greatest mistake of all—the failure to put across to the rest of the world what to India has become the essence of the Kashmir case. Once wrapped up in promises that would not be kept, in resolutions that would not be heeded, in reports that would not be implemented, India found itself unable to hammer home the one basic point.

Bireligious Survival

That point is that as far as India is concerned, the case of Kashmir involves not just the future of a valley but the future of a nation. No responsible Indian leader would be willing to forecast that the bireligious basis of this country would not be destroyed if Muslim Kashmir "deserted" India and went to Pakistan.

Perhaps "bireligious" is too strong a word. But there are 40 million Muslims in India, living among eight times as many Hindus. They live in an uneasy peace, a peace which could be shattered by something far less dramatic than evidence through a plebiscite that every Muslim in India would prefer to be a Muslim in Pakistan. Indian officials are afraid that an orgy of bloodletting would sweep India after a plebiscite in favor of Pakistan. They may be wrong, but as people who are in command and must accept the responsibility of government, they are not taking the chance.

To all this the Pakistanis say, "religious blackmail." They say this is proof that the Muslims in India are hostages. They say this is proof that the Indian government cannot control its own country.

All these charges have some truth in them. But true or not, they do not alter the basic fact that no Indian government can afford to take a risk which conceivably—not certainly, but at least conceivably—could destroy the nation.

Ford

(Continued from page 90)

between industry and government to expand such foreign investment activities. Industry can lend its people and its specialized skills to United States and United Nations agencies of economic development.

Much of the responsibility for encouraging the growth of American foreign investment abroad lies with the foreign countries themselves. If they want American dollars, they should accept the fact that respect for contracts is absolutely fundamental to our private enterprise system. Arbitrary actions in violation of agreements, such as Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal, pull the rug right out from under international investment.

U.S. Not Without Sin

But we ourselves are not without sin in some other respects. We sometimes fail to practice what we preach to our friends abroad.

One of the great continuing paradoxes of our country is its outlook on foreign trade. For years and years, it has been evident that the United States can contribute greatly to the strength of the free world by encouraging a maximum freeing of trade among nations. We have insistently urged others to relax their trade barriers. Though the present and preceding administrations have recog-

nized the importance of liberalized trade and fought for it, the United States still remains outside the international agency, the Organization for Trade Cooperation—of which we ourselves were the main sponsors—designed to provide a vehicle for orderly international cooperation in the lifting of trade barriers.

In recent years, despite the fact that we are enjoying unprecedented national prosperity, there has been a steady rise of protectionist sentiment in the land. The high-tariff people—a small but vociferous group—are still wagging the dog of American foreign economic policy, and still asking for and getting what amounts to a subsidy from every American consumer. We have got to keep in mind the fundamental and simple truth that, on the whole, protectionism is an unnecessary and expensive luxury for this particular great nation with its great responsibility for leadership in the world.

In summary, then, it seems evident that today we are up against a world situation of both immense possibilities and immense dangers. It is a situation so delicately poised that we probably can't afford to luck our way through it. We've got to play this one heads up. We are going, as I suggested a while ago, to have to act with a sanity, wisdom and unity without parallel.

In my opinion, we have to stop

defining our day-to-day actions in terms of rigid absolutes. We should be on guard against hypocrisy in determining whether or not we will deal with certain nations and their leaders on the basis of morality. The experience of the past two decades certainly ought to have taught us that there can be few absolutes in international affairs. Yesterday's implacable enemies are today's friends. Too often today's heroes are tomorrow's villains. Things do constantly change and there is no sense in swearing that we will never take up arms in a certain cause or do business with a certain country or system—because tomorrow may make liars of us.

It's time that we returned to the realities of the world we live in. I have no doubt that if we do we can once again assume a position of leadership in the world commensurate with our strength and with the greatness of our institutions.

I believe if the people of this country—private citizens like those of us here—will get interested more deeply and get into the heart of this struggle for a more effective foreign policy, then we shall be getting at the basic key to success.

(This article is excerpted from an address by Henry Ford II, president of Ford Motor Company, before the annual convention of the National Automobile Dealers Association, at the Civic Auditorium, San Francisco, California, on January 28, 1957.)

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